The rule of consistency is subject, however, to several major limitations. First, many courts refuse to apply the rule where conspirators are tried separately, since inconsistent results in this context can be explained by differences in jury composition, proof offered at the trials, or other factors.' Similarly, application of the rule does not apply to a lone conspirator's conviction if the co-conspirators' cases were not disposed of on the merits." Finally, the rule of consistency can be avoided where it is shown that a defendant, despite the acquittal of all indicted coconspirators, conspired with "persons unknown." 5 In the above hypothetical, however, because Fran and Nan, like most co-conspirators, were tried jointly, and none of the other exceptions apply, the acquittal of Nan will result in the acquittal of Fran as well.
The logic underlying the rule of consistency and its exceptions is not difficult to grasp. The essence of the common law crime of conspiracy is an agreement between two persons to commit a criminal offense. 6 According to the Fifth Circuit, "the acquittal of all but one potential conspirator negates the possibility of an agreement between the sole remaining defendant and one of those acquitted of the conspiracy and thereby denies, by definition, the existence of any conspiracy at all.''7 Under this reasoning, the conspiracy conviction of a lone defendant is invalid because the "verdict . . .itself den[ies] the existence of the essential facts" 8 constituting a conspiracy.
United States, 289 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961)). The rule of consistency, at least as applied to joint conspiracy trials, is followed uniformly in both the federal and state courts.' A panel of the Third Circuit recently suggested, however, that "the rule of consistency may be a vestige of the past." 10 In Standefer, the Court recognized that a jury acquittal of an alleged principal in a separate trial was not dispositive of an accessory's noninvolvement in the criminal transaction; an acquittal may result from factors entirely unrelated to a defendant's guilt or innocence, such as jury lenity and the inadmissibility of evidence. In contrast, the fundamental premise of the rule of consistency is that a defendant's acquittal proves absolutely that she was not involved in the conspiracy at issue. Because the possibility that different evidence will be admissible as to different defendants and that jury acquittals will be due to extralegal factors is present in the conspiracy context as well as in the principal/accessory context at issue in Standefer, a jury acquittal should not be interpreted as a verdict of innocence in either case. Therefore, the rule of consistency should no longer be applied in either joint or separate conspiracy trials, and acquittal of one conspirator should be of no legal relevance to the conviction of the other conspirator. Instead, review of an inconsistent conspiracy conviction should be limited to examination of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction.
Part I of this Comment discusses the common law origins of the rule of consistency and demonstrates that the historical conditions surrounding its development no longer exist and that the rule is irrelevant and inappropriate in the modern legal context. Part II analyzes the rule of consistency in the context of the Standefer decision, in which the Court declined to require consistency in the results of separate trials of an alleged principal and his accessory, and concludes that the same
I See Annotation, Prosecution or Conviction of One Conspirator as Affected by
Disposition of Case Against Coconspirators, 19 A.L.R. 4TH 192, 198-201 (1983) .
'0 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) .
1 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (approving inconsistent verdicts for related charges of unlawful possession and sale of alcohol and maintenance of a nuisance by keeping alcohol for sale during the prohibition era).
12 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (approving inconsistent verdicts for related charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to do so, and use of the telephone to facilitate narcotics violations). 13 447 U.S. 10 (1980) (approving inconsistent verdicts in separate conspiracy trials of an alleged principal and his accessory).
rule should be applied in the conspiracy context.
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RULE OF CONSISTENCY
The conspiracy rule of consistency, like the crime from which it is derived, is firmly rooted in the common law. There is, however, considerable debate over the validity of the crime of conspiracy itself. 1 4 One commentator has characterized the development of the law in the area as "a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought." 1 " The common law development of the rule of consistency and its subsequent importation into American criminal law also fit this description. Although the rule may originally have served a beneficial purpose, it lacks value in the context of the modern American criminal justice system.
A. The Development of the Rule of Consistency in England
In the late nineteenth century, Lord Coleridge observed that the rule that two conspirators "both must be convicted or both must be acquitted . . . [was] determined, or, if not determined, taken for granted from very early times."" 0 The lineage of the rule can be traced back almost four centuries to the case of Marsh v. Vauhan.1 7 In that case, two defendants were indicted and tried jointly for conspiracy, with the result that one was convicted, and the other acquitted. The court quashed the lone defendant's conviction, reasoning in a paragraph-long opinion that "one cannot conspire alone." ' By the late nineteenth century, subsequent decisions addressing this issue had firmly planted the Marsh rule into the common law. In the 1974 case of R. v. Shannon, 2° the British Court of Appeal, Criminal Division and, on review, the House of Lords, conducted exhaustive examinations of these decisions. The appeals court reluctantly adhered to the rule of consistency in quashing the defendant's conviction pursuant to a guilty plea where his alleged co-conspirator was subsequently acquitted. The House of Lords held that the rule did not apply in this context and restored the conviction. Both courts' historical analyses concluded that the "fundamental principle" articulated in Marsh-that a conspiracy requires agreement by two-ultimately led to the British courts' acceptance of the rule of consistency. 2 " The link between the plurality requirement of conspiracy and the rule of consistency, however, is tenuous. For example, in R. v. Thompson, 22 A, B, and C were indicted and tried jointly for conspiracy. The jury convicted A but acquitted both B and C, saying that although it was certain that A had conspired with one of the two, it was not certain which. The court held that since both of A's alleged co-conspirators had been acquitted, the verdict against A could not stand, although the court expressed regret that A should "escape" as the result of such a rule. 23 Clearly, this situation is incompatible with the underlying premise of the rule of consistency-that a jury acquittal of all but one defendant presents the impossible result that the lone convicted defendant conspired with herself. In Thompson, the jury clearly articulated its certainty of the existence of a criminal agreement between two persons and its certainty of the participation in that agreement by the defendant it convicted. Since the verdict cannot be interpreted as a conclusion by the jury that the defendant conspired alone, the court's application of the rule of consistency is difficult to justify. 2 "
The development of the rule of consistency, however, actually had more to do with the pre-twentieth century English system of criminal appellate review than with the rule's logical foundation. Prior to 1907, a criminal defendant could seek review of a conviction only through a writ of error. Under this system, judicial review was limited to an appraisal of the formal record of the case-"the arraignment, the plea, the issue and the verdict." '25 The inability of appellate courts to secure justice through review of the most common sources of trial error, such as wrongly admitted evidence or jury misdirections, 26 forced these courts to "adopt a strict and technical approach to errors on the record as a means of widening the process of review." '2 Thus the development of the rule of consistency must be viewed in the context of the appellate system in which it arose. 2 ' A conspiracy trial verdict showing the acquittal of one conspirator and the conviction of the other presented an inconsistency on the face of the record. Since the reviewing court was entirely unable to examine the substance of the proceedings leading to such a result, the conclusion that a "technically" wrong verdict was invalid as a matter of law 29 ultimately represented the only method of protecting a criminal defendant against jury prejudice or misapplication of the law."° Thus, the rule of consistency worked as a quasi-appellate method of review for courts with little other recourse. In 1907, however, review by writ of error was abolished in England by the Criminal Appeal Act. 3 1 For the first time, the reviewing court was permitted to look beyond the formal record of the case and correct any errors arising in the trial proceedings. As the court in Shannon concluded:
Where only the record could be looked at, it was no doubt right to give great weight to repugnancy but now since 1907 as the evidence can be examined and regard had to what actually took place at the trial, there seems no valid reason why such importance should be attached to the appearance of repugnancy on the record. 2 The judges particularly stressed the appellate courts' post-1907 ability 25 to determine whether differential admissibility of evidence as between two defendants in fact produced inconsistencies more apparent than real 3 and concluded that the rule of consistency was inapplicable to separate trials of co-conspirators. ' The Shannon result was subsequently codified and extended to joint trials in the Criminal Law Act of 1977. 35 
B. Treatment of the Rule of Consistency in American Courts
The logical and historical foundations of the rule of consistency have seldom been questioned by American courts, aside from the issue of the rule's applicability to separate trials. 6 A notable and instructive exception, however, is the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa. 7 Although the facts of this case fit neatly within the "separate trials" exception to the rule, the court questioned the soundness of the rule itself. Noting that the rule of consistency "undoubtedly was originally simply transplanted from the English system," 3 8 the court concluded that the review by the House of Lords in Shannon of the origins of the rule of consistency in the writ system "makes abundantly clear its inappropriateness to a modern American criminal jus- tice system in which all verdicts obviously are, and always have been, subject to independent review for evidentiary support." 9 The Supreme Court, however, has not acted under its supervisory power over the federal courts to foreclose the application of the conspiracy rule of consistency. In fact, the Court itself has on at least one occasion reversed a conspiracy conviction on the ground of inconsistency. 4 0 In Standefer v. United States, 4 1 however, the Court upheld a conviction for aiding and abetting the commission of a federal offense despite the prior acquittal of the alleged principal. 42 The Court has not attempted to reconcile the tension between its earlier application of the rule of consistency and its decision in Standefer.
II. THE RULE OF CONSISTENCY Is NOT CONSISTENT WITH Standefer
The factors underlying the Standefer decision indicate that the rule of consistency is no longer tenable in joint or separate conspiracy trials. The Standefer decision rested on the differential admissibility of evidence as between defendants and the existence of jury lenity leading to inconsistent verdicts. These problems are also present when conspirators are tried jointly.
A. The Standefer Decision and the Rule of Consistency
In Standefer v. United States, 4 " the Supreme Court considered the effect of an alleged principal's acquittal on the case against his accessory. The defendant had been convicted of aiding and abetting an Internal Revenue Service agent in accepting illegal payments. The agent, however, had been previously tried and acquitted of receiving the illegal payments. In felony cases under common law, "an accessory could not be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender."' 4 The Supreme Court did not follow this common law rule in Standefer; rather, it held, without dissent, that a principal's prior acquittal is irrelevant to the prosecution of the accessory and therefore affirmed the conviction. The defendant argued that the federal aiding and abetting statute4 5 did not authorize this result. The Court's analysis of the legislative history of the statute, however, led it to conclude that Congress intended to make "all participants in conduct violating a federal criminal statute . . . punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other participants is irrelevant."' 6 Further, the defendant contended that the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel prevented the prosecution. Under this doctrine, a party may not assert a claim it has previously lost against another defendant.' The defendant argued that the IRS agent's prior acquittal barred the government from relitigating the issue of the agent's guilt in connection with the defendant's own prosecution. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the criminal prosecution was entirely inappropriate. 48 This conclusion implicitly recognizes that a verdict of not guilty is not a verdict of innocence and that no particular meaning can be attached to a jury acquittal. The Court noted that inconsistent results in separate trials may arise from several factors unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the respective defendants, such as evidence admissible against one but not the other, 49 or the exercise of lenity by a jury with respect to one Qf the defendants. 50 The inability of a court to interpret the meaning of a jury acquittal, then, underlies the Court's conclusion that although the rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel in criminal cases may on occasion produce seemingly inconsistent results, 
B. Differential Admissibility of Evidence as Between Defendants
One of the major obstacles to the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in the criminal context, the Standefer Court explained, is that "[lt is frequently true in criminal cases that evidence inadmissible against one defendant is admissible against another." 5 ' 9 The Court recognized that when the government was unable to present all of its proof against one defendant in a previous trial, it would be inappropriate to foreclose litigation of the issue of that defendant's criminal involvement with others in its subsequent prosecutions of other defendants against whom the proof can be admitted. 60 This result is logical; an acquittal obtained by the exclusion of relevant evidence would not afford the government a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" 61 and should not preclude litigation of the issue of another defendant's guilt. 6 2
The problem of differential admissibility of evidence clearly should prevent the rule of consistency from operating in separate trials. The problem also exists, however, where conspirators are tried jointly, 63 typical in the majority of cases. The Fifth Circuit's observation that "[g]enerally, persons jointly indicted should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases,"" reflects the general federal policy of joinder of defendants accused of criminal complicity in the interests of judicial convenience and economy. 6 5 Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may seek severance if such joinder would be prejudicial; however, such severance is within the discretion of the trial court.
66 "[A] defendant is not automatically entitled to sever- 68 If denied severance, the defendant must demonstrate on appeal that she is "unable to obtain a fair trial without a severance," and that she will suffer "compelling prejudice against which the trial court will be unable to afford protection." United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978).
ance because the evidence against a codefendant is more damaging than the evidence against him." ' In many joint conspiracy trials, the evidence of complicity may vary substantially as between defendants. 6 8 In Blumenthal v. United States," 9 the Supreme Court cited with approval a now standard remedy in such circumstances: the jury should be instructed that "the guilt or innocence of each defendant must be determined by the jury separately. Each defendant has the same right to that kind of consideration on your part as if he were being tried alone." 70 Such an instruction is designed to limit the "dangers of transference of guilt ' [Vol. 135:223 bars the admission of that evidence against that defendant.". As the Court noted, however, "the same evidence . . . may be admissible against other parties to the crime 'whose rights were [not] violated,' ",78 and who thus lack standing to assert the exclusionary rule. 79 This situation may also arise where conspiracy defendants are tried jointly.
The requirement of consistency between a jury's conspiracy verdicts is no more tenable than the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in the criminal context rejected by the Standefer Court. Inherent in both positions is the fallacious notion that a criminal acquittal is the equivalent of a verdict of innocence. The court in R. v. Shannon 0 explained the problem inherent in such a proposition and in the rule of consistency:
The law in action is not concerned with absolute truth, but with proof. . . in accordance with . . . rules relating to admissibility of evidence. No doubt, in the realm of the absolute, A could not conspire with B without B also conspiring with A. But it by no means follows that it cannot be proved forensically that A conspired with B . . .notwithstanding a total failure of forensic proof, as against B, that B conspired with A ... 81 Thus, in cases where differential admissibility of evidence exists between conspiracy defendants, the rule of consistency will operate to invalidate jury verdicts that, according to the rules of evidence, are not only possible but appropriate. The rule has been criticized on this ground by commentators since 186582 and by courts in rejecting the rule as applied to separate trials. No logical distinction justifies the rule's application to a joint conspiracy trial, where the evidence presented against each defendant is similarly susceptible to variance. Finally, application of the rule of consistency in joint conspiracy trials would tend to undermine the rules developed by the Supreme Court governing a defendant's right to assert the exclusionary rule. Under the rule of consistency, the acquittal of one defendant, possibly resulting from the exclusion of evidence, would necessarily involve the acquittal of the other against whom the evidence was admissible. Certainly this result subverts the rule that certain constitutional rights "may not be vicariously asserted" 8 by affording a defendant whose rights were not violated the benefits of suppression-a result condemned by the Court in Standefer. 84 The Standefer Court's conclusion that differential admissibility of evidence as between defendants precludes the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel should also preclude the application of the rule of consistency in both separate and joint conspiracy trials where such evidentiary problems exist. Under such circumstances, the rule may operate to invalidate jury verdicts rendered in accord with both the judge's instructions and the evidence. Furthermore, the rule serves to extend the vicarious benefit of suppression of evidence to those who have "suffered no encroachment on [their] liberty," 5 thereby allowing "guilty defendants to go free without serving any countervailing purpose. ' The rule of consistency should not "remedy" a situation where, according to the rules of evidence, no inconsistency is present.
C. Jury Lenity and Inconsistent Verdicts
In many joint conspiracy trials the evidence admitted against each defendant will be the same. 87 In such cases, "'error,' in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred" 88 when the jury convicts only one of two or more defendants in a conspiracy trial. It is difficult to interpret such a result: was the jury convinced of the guilt of all, but chose for unknown reasons to acquit particular defendants; did it single out and convict a particular defendant out of passion or prejudice; or did it simply misunderstand the plurality requirement of conspiracy?
The rule of consistency is based on the assumption that inconsis- 
The Dunn Doctrine of Inconsistent Verdicts
Dunn involved liquor law violations in the prohibition era. During prohibition, juries frequently arrived at verdicts seemingly devoid of logic. A fairly common result, exemplified by Dunn, was the acquittal of a defendant on counts of unlawful possession and unlawful sale of .alcohol, joined with a conviction for maintenance of a nuisance by keeping alcohol for sale. The liquor laws were unpopular 5 and ultimately were repealed in 1933.6 It is a fair inference that inconsistent verdicts in liquor law prosecutions reflected juries' unwillingness to expose defendants to criminal liability for multiple violations of laws that they did not support. 9 7 The federal circuits split on the issue of whether nuisance convictions were valid notwithstanding acquittals on counts alleging the possession and sale of alcohol. The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Dunn, holding that the defendant's conviction for a nuisance by keeping alcohol for sale was valid, irrespective of clearly inconsistent acquittals by the same jury on charges of possession and sale of alcohol. 9 9 The defendant asserted that the acquittal on the possession count rendered the nuisance conviction inconsistent and invalid, since the proof of both counts "consist[ed] of identical evidence." 100 The Court, quoting the Second Circuit, replied:
"The most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but . . . not . . . that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power . . . to which they were disposed through lenity." 10 1
This conclusion seems reasonable, given the circumstances of the case. The facts of Dunn suggest that the defendant, owner of a "speakeasy," was caught redhanded in blatant violation of the liquor laws.
10 2 The public, however, strongly opposed the laws; prohibition would be repealed only three years later. Thus, the Court in Dunn interpretation of the jury's inconsistent acquittals on the alcohol possession and sales charges as an exercise of lenity rather than a negation of the facts embodied in these counts was a realistic and sensible appraisal of the ver-295 F. 489, 490 (3d Cir. 1924) (holding that where verdict was guilty on one count and not guilty on other counts, the verdict of guilty had to be based on evidence other than that pleaded in support of the other counts). See also Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1925) (holding that inconsistency renders nuisance conviction invalid where the identical evidence was introduced to support all counts).
11 See Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393. But see id. at 397-98 (Butler, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury's verdict was necessarily inconsistent). 100 Id. at 392. [Vol. 135:223 dict and its surrounding circumstances. In its approval of the jury's balancing of the law and justice, the Court implicitly recognized the jury's role as "the voice of the country."' 1 0 3 The result in Dunn therefore reflects a concomitant reluctance to give a defendant a windfall exceeding that already obtained through jury lenity-that is, acquittal on all counts based on the "inconsistency" of convictions on particular counts with legally questionable acquittals on other counts. The Dunn case represents a practical and just compromise between "the jury's role in seeing that the individual gets justice with mercy"' 0 4 and "the important federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law. 1o5 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24. 108 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (Where jury convicted corporate president, but not corporation, of shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, inconsistency is not grounds for reversal.); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974) (Jury's inability to reach verdict on charge that defendants used mail to distribute allegedly obscene book did not preclude finding that defendants' mailing of advertisements that described how to obtain book constituted distribution of obscene materials.).
107 Powell, 469 U.S. at 63. As examples of cases in which the circuit courts of appeals had recognized exceptions to the Dunn rule, the Powell Court referred to: United States v. Brooks, 703 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1983) (Dunn rule is inapplicable where defendant was charged with conspiracy in one count and, in a separate count, with using a telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy.); United States v. Morales, 677 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982) (Where jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to misapply monies of a federally insured bank, but not guilty of the substantive crime of fraudulent check cashing, such findings constituted plain error.); and United States v. Hannah, 584 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1978) (Government's theory of prosecution-that acts constituting a felony with which defendant was charged were same acts constituting an alleged conspiracy-precluded an inconsistent verdict by the jury.).
1os 469 U.S. 57 (1984) . 109 See id. at 59-60.
the defendant on the telephone charge but acquitting on all others, 11 following other circuit decisions holding that convictions on this charge "must be reversed where the conviction on the underlying conspiracy counts is reversed." ' 11 1
The Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit and reinstated the defendant's telephone facilitation conviction. In doing so, the Court rejected the line of circuit decisions attempting to distinguish the reversals of inconsistent telephone facilitation acquittals from the Dunn rule and strongly reaffirmed the validity of the rule itself." 1 2 The Court presented a detailed analysis of the factors embodied in the Dunn rule. First, courts are not able to interpret the reasons for a jury acquittal."' Second, the jury's power to exercise leniency is valuable." 4 Third, courts should not speculate about jury deliberations."
5 Finally, evidentiary review safeguards against erroneous verdicts."" These factors make clear the continuing relevancy and appropriateness of the Dunn approach to inconsistent verdicts in the American criminal justice system.
When a jury renders a truly inconsistent verdict, "it is unclear whose ox has been gored." 11 7 Such a verdict is ambiguous as to which of the convictions or acquittals the jury really meant. Under these circumstances, as one court has noted, "it might be possible to speculate indefinitely as to what paths the jury followed in reaching its conclu- ale that inconsistent verdicts are often a product of jury lenity. 12 1 The jury's acquittal may be based on extralegal factors irrelevant to the validity of the conviction. One commentator has suggested that this position is merely an assumption and that "[rjeliance on such an assumption is a serious breach of the systematic protections designed to ensure a sound basis for conviction of criminal defendants.
' 122 An examination of the factors underlying this assumption, however, reveals that the Dunn doctrine does not reflect a wholesale rejection of defendants' rights, but a prudent balancing of the role of the jury and the need to ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions.
The Powell Court's assertion that verdict inconsistency "often" results from juries' exercises of leniency has not been tested empirically. 1 23 Aside from the question of how often jurors exercise such leniency, it must be recognized that to require consistency in all jury verdicts would severely limit their ability to exercise leniency at all. Under the rule of consistency a jury could not acquit one defendant on the basis of leniency without being forced to acquit the other as well. A jury may well forego any acquittal if that is the only possible result. A jury should be able to apply leniency in "the difficult cases where [it] wishes to avoid an all-or-nothing verdict," 12 4 regardless of the inconsistency in results thereby produced. Though some commentators question the jury's ability to exercise such discretion properly, 12 5 the result in Powell implicitly recognizes:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. JURY (1966) , the authors collected judges' reports on over 3500 criminal trials in order to assess both the extent of and reasons for juries' deviations from the judges' views of the legally prescribed results in these trials. Particularly relevant in the context of inconsistent verdicts is the study's descriptions of the "sympathetic defendant," a defendant particularly appealing to the jury in terms of sex, race, age, appearance, courtroom demeanor, and other factors, as a substantial and consistent source of judge-jury disagreement, see id. at 193-218, and of the juries' tendency to exercise leniency where a defendant's misfortunes resulting from the commission of the crime lead them to believe that she has been "punished enough." See id. at 301-05. This study indicates a substantial basis for the Powell Court's conclusion that, in the context of inconsistent verdicts, it is not unlikely that extralegal factors have played a role in the jury's decision. The jury's ability to interpose its own sense of justice between the rigor of legal principle and the equities of a particular case underlies "the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch." 1 2 The jury's ability to deliver an inconsistent verdict permits the community to provide its judgment on whether the punishment fits the crime. To deny the jury this power is a serious encroachment on its essential function. If courts were to analyze and dismiss jury verdicts for inconsistencies, " 'they would miss the very thing for which they are looking, the opinion of the country.' ""28 Thus, the Powell Court's reaffirmation of the Dunn doctrine is based in part upon its recognition of the jury's role as a guardian of individual liberty, at the cost of verdicts which on occasion are legally "incorrect."
Furthermore, as the Powell Court noted, an attempt to assess the consistency of a jury verdict "would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake." '29 Such post hoc examinations of juries' deliberative processes have been limited in the federal courts to cases of "extraneous influences" on the processes, including outside publicity received by jurors, consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in court, and jurors' communications with third parties. 3° In contrast, "matters which essentially inhere in the verdict itself," 1 31 including both "the mental process of any juror or the jury in arriving at a verdict" 13 2 and "the method by which the verdict is reached,"' 33 are not competent to impeach a jury verdict." 3 4 This distinction relies on the traditional sovereignty of the jury as the "voice of the country": where the defendant has received a fair trial, and where no outside forces have distorted the jury's message, its conclusion should not be questioned. 13 5 Thus, absent allegations of extraneous influences on the jury, verdict inconsistency should not be interpreted as more than "the give-and-take within [the] microcosm of the community." ' "[T]hrough this deference," the Powell Court noted, "the jury brings to the criminal process, in addition to the collective judgment of the community, an element of needed finality.
137
Underlying these notions of jury sovereignty is the Powell Court's recognition that criminal defendants are already "afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts." 138 Under the federal rules, a defendant may move for acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction" after the evidence on either side is closed, 13 9 and where the jury returns a verdict of guilty. 14 0 Due process requires that before an accused can be convicted, the prosecution must present "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 4 Recently, in Jackson v. Virginia, 42 the Court clarified the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. To meet the standard on review of a conviction, it must be found that "the record evidence could reasonably sup--port a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 4 Thus, where a jury's conviction on one count is inconsistent with its acquittals on others, both the trial and the appellate courts may directly review the substance of the evidence supporting that conviction for sufficiency. Where such evidence is in fact found sufficient, an interpretation of such inconsistencies as unreviewable products of jury lenity is warranted, and absent a showing of jury misconduct, necessary to preserve the role of the criminal jury. Evidentiary review ensures that the preservation of jury sovereignty through tolerance of verdict inconsistency 1s4 See id. at 148-50. will not be at the expense of the defendant's fundamental right to a reliable conviction.
The Rule of Consistency and the Dunn Doctrine of Inconsistent Verdicts
The Supreme Court's approval of inconsistent verdicts springs from its recognition that a criminal acquittal may arise from jury leniency or other extralegal factors, and thus that acquittal is not dispositive of a defendant's innocence "in the sense of having done the act charged."' 4 4 This recognition underlies the Court's refusal to extend nonmutual collateral estoppel to an accessory following the acquittal of the principal in Standefer v. United States. 145 Furthermore, that evidence may be inadmissible in the principal's trial but admissible against the accessory may also explain an inconsistent verdict. ' Application of the rule of consistency in joint conspiracy trials where only one of two or more defendants is convicted also presents these difficulties. First, evidence may be admissible against only one of two conspiracy defendants, rendering such a result only superficially inconsistent. Further, even where no such evidentiary problems exist, the Supreme Court's Dunn and Powell analyses ultimately require interpretation of the inconsistent verdicts as an exercise by the jury of its power to acquit for extralegal reasons. As in Standefer, then, such an acquittal is of no relevance to the validity of an inconsistent conviction. Lastly, the rejection of the nonmutual estoppel doctrine in criminal cases in Standefer was based on the possibility that a jury acquittal might contain irrationality. A jury verdict convicting only one of several conspiracy defendants clearly indicates that the jury has not followed the judge's directions. In a strictly legal sense, such a verdict lacks a rational basis. Where this is so, according to Powell, "principles of collateral estoppel-which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict-are no longer useful.' 147 Thus, the rule of consistency, which operates to bar a jury conviction of one conspirator based on its own acquittal of a fellow conspirator, is itself inconsistent with the principles of collateral estop- pel underlying the Standefer decision and with the fundamental acceptability of such verdicts embodied in the Court's Dunn and Powell decisions.
This Comment proposes, then, that the rule of consistency, even in its presently narrow application,' 4 8 has no subsisting validity and should be abandoned. In place of this mechanical rule, which operates to invalidate automatically any jury conspiracy verdict containing an apparent inconsistency, a reviewing court should simply examine the inconsistent conviction for evidentiary support. A recent First Circuit decision, United States v. Cyr,' 8 although falling within the "separate trials" exception to the rule of consistency, serves to illustrate the proper disposition of an inconsistent conspiracy verdict in the absence of a per se rule of consistency. In this case, the defendants, C, a wouldbe restaurateur, B and K, business associates of C, and M, a bank loan officer, were indicted for, inter alia, conspiring to misapply bank funds in connection with a wide-ranging scheme of loans fraudulently obtained for the use of C's restaurant business. The trial jury convicted C but acquitted K and M on the conspiracy count.' 50 In response to C's challenge to the consistency of this conviction, the court first noted, in accordance with Dunn, that a jury's verdict should not be set aside solely on grounds of inconsistency.'' Next, the court noted that it was "clear that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that [C and M] conspired together to misapply bank funds ....
"5' Finally, the court, though recognizing that it was under no obligation to do so, pointed out several factors that may have produced the inconsistency in results, including that only C personally profited from the loans, that there was testimony indicating M's honesty and integrity, and that according to C's own testimony "she was responsible for [M's] downfall.'1 5 3 The court's enumeration of these factors suggests at the very least that circumstances evoking jury compassion and leniency can and do arise within the ambit of a conspiracy trial. Accordingly, the Cyr court properly limited its review of the lone conspiracy conviction to the 354 (1981) ). In Cyr, one of the alleged conspirators became ill during the trial, and therefore received a severance. Thus, the "separate trials" exception to the rule of consistency seems to have barred the application of the rule in this case. The court does not mention the rule in its opinion. Under the reasoning of the court and this Comment, however, the presence and acquittal of this defendant would not, but for the rule of consistency, have affected its result. 152 Id. at 734. 158 Id.
sufficiency of the evidence. Under the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in Standefer, Dunn, and Powell, a defendant is "entitled to no less-and to no more." 1 54
CONCLUSION
The essence, and fundamental flaw, of the rule of consistency lies in the assumption that a jury acquittal conclusively demonstrates a defendant's lack of involvement in a criminal transaction. Such an assumption is incompatible with the Supreme Court's well-settled approval of inconsistent verdicts and its recognition that criminal acquittals may result from a number of factors unrelated to a defendant's guilt, including the inadmissibility of evidence and the exercise of lenity by a jury.
For these reasons, the ultimate effect of the rule of consistency may often be a purposeless grant of immunity to one defendant based on factors personal to a codefendant and ultimately unrelated to the actual existence of a conspiracy. As such, review of inconsistent conspiracy convictions should be limited to consideration of the sufficiency of the supporting evidence and should disregard the legally irrelevant acquittals of a conspirator's lucky cohorts.
154 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 26.
[Vol. 135:223
NOYES LEECH
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review dedicates this issue to Professor Noyes Leech, William A. Schnader Professor of Law and a former Editor-in-Chief of this journal. The selections that follow paint a rich portrait of a distinguished scholar whose dedication to service, commitment to rigorous academic standards, and concern for the well-being of others had a profound effect on his colleagues and students. The Law Review wishes Professor Leech well in his future endeavors.
